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The effect of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on cost of debt: evidence from 
Canadian firms 
 
 
Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relation between GHG emissions and cost of 
debt and to estimate the cost that lenders are imputing to GHG emissions. Data on GHG 
emissions were hand-collected from Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) reports, while data 
on the cost of debt and other financial data were obtained from Bloomberg Professional 
database. Using a sample of Canadian firms, the results show that GHG emissions 
increase firms’ cost of debt. In other words, for each additional tonne of GHG emissions, 
the cost of debt increases on average by 11-15%. These results imply that creditors 
incorporate firms’ GHG emissions into their lending decisions and they penalize the 
polluting firms. This could encourage firms to reduce and manage their GHG emissions 
since there is a cost associated with these emissions. This study is one of the first to 
examine the relationship between GHG emissions and the cost of debt.  
Keywords: GHG emissions; Climate change; Cost of debt; Environmental policy; 
Canada. 
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Introduction 
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, also called carbon emissions, are increasing from year 
to year all over the globe (CDP, 2014; EPA, 2017). According to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) (2009), the increase in GHGs in the atmosphere is considered 
one of the key causes of the recent global warming. For example, in Canada, the increase 
in GHGs could result, by 2050, in an increase in temperatures of up to 5°C in the south 
and 9°C in the north, and an increase in precipitation; heavy rains could cause flooding 
and erosion problems (CDP, 2014).  
Although environmental science research seems to confirm the adverse impacts of GHG 
emissions on climate change, there is little accounting and financial research has done on 
the financial effects of these emissions for firms. 
Some researchers examined the effect of GHG emissions on firm’s market value 
(Chapple et al., 2013; Matsumura et al., 2014; Saka and Oshika, 2014; Griffin et al., 
2017) or on its cost of equity1 (Li et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2015). However, very few 
studies have examined the impact of GHG emissions on firm’s cost of debt2.  Moreover, 
most of the previous studies were focused on U.S. and Australian firms. The aim of this 
paper is to investigate the relation between GHG emissions and cost of debt and to 
estimate the cost that lenders are imputing to GHG emissions.  
According to the Financial Times Lexicon3, “the cost of debt is the effective rate that a 
company pays on its current loans, bonds and various other forms of debt. The measure 
provides an idea as to the overall rate being paid by the company to use debt financing”. 
                                                           
1 The cost of equity is the rate of return required by shareholders to compensate for the risk they undertake 
by investing their capital. 
2 The cost of debt is a measure of the risk that lenders take into account when they lend money to a firm. 
3 http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=cost-of-debt. 
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A higher cost of debt means the company has poor credit and higher risk. A lower cost of 
debt implies the company has good credit and less risk.  
This paper seeks to address this research gap and to contribute to the literature in several 
ways. First, I focus on Canadian firms, a sample not previously studied with regard to 
GHG emissions. Indeed, Canada is ranked 9th of the top 10 emissions producers, but is 
the top producer per capita, approximately 6 percent higher than the United States and 19 
percent above the world average (See Figure 1)4. Second, I use data over a period of 4 
years, from 2012 to 2015, compared to prior studies (Stanny and Ely, 2008; He et al., 
2013; Chapple et al., 2013; Luo and Tang, 2014) that focus on a single year. Third, I use 
data on GHG emissions from Carbon disclosure project (CDP) reports compared to prior 
studies (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Hossain and Reaz, 2007; Clarkson et al., 2008; Kolk, 
2008) that used firms’ annual or sustainability reports. These CDP reports are considered 
more comprehensive, reliable and comparable sources of data than the other data sources 
as they provide few opportunities for managers to manipulate the data on GHG emissions 
(Luo et al., 2012; He et al., 2013; Luo and Tang, 2014; Lee et al., 2015). Fourth, I focus 
on one particular item of pollution that is GHG emissions. Indeed, GHG pollution differs 
from other types of chemical pollution in that it causes global warming. Laws and 
legislations are also different (Lash and Wellington, 2007; Luo and Tang, 2014). Fifth, I 
use in this study a more comprehensive measure of cost of debt calculated by Bloomberg, 
compared to previous studies (Orens et al., 2010; Lorca et al., 2011; Zhu, 2014; Jung et 
al., 2014; Li et al., 2014) that used weak measures based on interest rates only. Finally, I 
                                                           
4 Other sources, such as the World Bank, show somewhat different data on total GHG emissions per capita. 
However, the World Bank data do not include GHG emissions from land use such as deforestation. In 
Figure 1, data on total GHG emissions per capita include land use change and forestry (LUCF), which 
gives a more complete picture of emissions and a better comparison between countries. The World Bank 
data can be viewed at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC?year_high_desc=true. 
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include in my sample all activity sectors compared to other studies (Clarkson et al., 2008; 
Kim et al., 2015) that focused only on industrial and energy sectors.  
The remainder of the present paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
Carbon disclosure project (CDP), while Section 3 provides a brief overview of GHG-
related legislation in Canada. The review of relevant literature on GHG emissions is 
presented in section 4, leading to the development of our hypothesis in section 5. Section 
6 then describes the methodology. The results are presented in Section 7 and Section 8 
concludes. 
 
Carbon disclosure project (CDP) 
In the last years, firms have faced increasing pressure from various stakeholders, 
including investors, lenders, financial risk managers, insurance companies, and NGOs, to 
measure, monitor, manage and disclose their GHG emissions (Fornaro et al., 2009; 
Matsumura et al., 2014). 
In order to focus firms on taking urgent action to build a truly sustainable economy by 
measuring and understanding their environmental impact, the Carbon disclosure project 
(CDP) was formed in the U.K. in 2000. 
Since 2002, the CDP, an independent not-for-profit organization acting on behalf of over 
800 institutional investors around the world, sends every year a questionnaire to the 
world’s 6000 largest firms to ask information about their GHG emissions, risks, strategies 
and plans for managing and reducing these emissions (Wegener et al., 2013; Matsumura 
et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2015). Today, nearly a fifth of global GHG emissions are reported 
through CDP, giving it the largest database of primary corporate climate change 
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information in the world (CDP, 2016). For example, in Canada, 60 % of the top 200 
largest firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (S&P/TSX) responded to the CDP 
questionnaire in 2014 (approximately 120 firms) (CDP, 2014).  
According to many authors (Wegener et al., 2013; He et al., 2013; Luo and Tang, 2014; 
Matsumura et al., 2014; Lee et al., 2015), the evidence has shown that the standard CDP 
report allows for less flexibility for managers to manipulate the outcome, implying that 
the GHG information that it provides is useful for decision makers. 
 
Canadian GHG legislation  
Since the Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement linked to the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Canadian government has 
set ambitious targets to reduce GHG emissions at the national level. However, after a few 
years of implementation, the average emissions reduction progress of firms in Canada 
was behind schedule (CDP, 2014). Moreover, the Canadian government has decided in 
2011 not to comply with the Kyoto Protocol, while many other countries simply chose to 
ignore it (RCGT, 2016). 
More recently, in 2016, Canada has ratified the Paris Climate Change Agreement 
(RCGT, 2016). However, it is still very early to know the outcome of this agreement. In 
order to comply with this agreement, the federal government of Canada announced a new 
Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change. This framework is the 
governmental plan to meet GHG emissions reduction targets. It includes a pan-Canadian 
approach to pricing carbon pollution, and measures to achieve reductions across all 
sectors of the economy. According to this framework, all Canadian provinces are 
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expected, by 2018, to have a GHG emissions regulatory mechanism such as a carbon tax 
or a cap-and-trade system (RCGT, 2016; Osler, 2016). 
This implies higher fines and financial penalties for firms that fail to meet the GHG 
reduction target. Some authors call this a carbon risk (IPCC, 2007; Kim et al., 2015). 
 
Literature review 
Increased regulations on GHG emissions have generated a new field of research known 
as carbon accounting. In this setting, Matsumura et al. (2014) found a negative 
association between GHG emissions and market value of U.S. firms. Their results show 
that, on average, the market value decreases by $212,000 for every additional thousand 
metric tons of GHG emissions. 
In a similar study, Chapple et al. (2013) also report a negative association between a 
dichotomous measure of high- and low-GHG emissions intensity and the market value of 
Australian firms that are subject to new national regulations. Their results show that high-
GHG-intensive firms suffer a penalty of 6.57 percent of market capitalization compared 
to other low-GHG-intensive firms. 
Using a sample of Japanese firms, Saka and Oshika (2014) also found that GHG 
emissions have a negative relation with market value of equity. More recently, Griffin et 
al. (2017) report that GHG emissions are negatively associated with stock price, and 
further, the negative relation is more pronounced for GHG-intensive firms. These market-
value penalties associated with GHG emissions reflect the perceived relationship between 
GHG emissions and the firm’s climate change related risk profile. This risk is generally 
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driven by climate change regulations and the uncertainty surrounding compliance with 
these regulations (Epstein, 2008; Matsumura et al., 2014). 
Other few studies have examined the relationship between GHG emissions and cost of 
equity, but the results are mixed. For instance, Kim et al. (2015) found that GHG 
emissions are positively related to the cost of equity of South Korean firms. However, Li 
et al. (2014) found little evidence that the GHG emissions affect the cost of equity of 
Australian companies. 
 
Hypothesis development 
Most of previous studies on cost of debt have been based on agency theory (Armstrong et 
al., 2010). In the context of GHG emissions, agency problems may arise when the visions 
or expectations of a lender and a borrower with regard to GHG-intensive projects are not 
aligned. 
Indeed, GHG-intensive projects can be seen by lenders as risky because they usually 
involve the externalization of carbon pollution which is accompanied by the risk of 
having the implicit costs being explicitly shifted back to firms (Goss and Roberts, 2011). 
With increasing GHG-related legislations and regulations, a large portion of externalized 
costs could also be internalized (Jung et al., 2014). 
The main agency problem is that, if GHG-intensive projects are successful, shareholders 
will benefit from most of the profits, but if unsuccessful, creditors will bear most of the 
costs. Moreover, even if GHG-intensive projects are successful, the creditors could face 
reputational risks associated with financing polluting projects. With the increasing GHG-
related legislations and regulations, GHG-intensive firms may also have to incur costs 
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related to their GHG emissions through taxes or cap-and-trade systems, as well as the 
costs of reducing GHG emissions through the development of low-carbon technologies 
(Jung et al., 2014; Kim et al., 2015). 
As lenders are exposed to carbon risk through their lending activities, they are expected 
to implement possible solutions such as the incorporation of carbon risk into their credit 
risk assessment and price protection through interest rates (Jung et al., 2014; Li et al., 
2014). According to Matsumura et al. (2014), GHG emissions must be an essential 
element in analyzing a company’s risk profile. Indeed, with increasing GHG-related 
legislations and regulations, financial institutions may face additional costs and risks 
when lending money to GHG-intensive firms (Wegener et al., 2013; Li et al. 2014). 
If a firm is GHG emissions-intensive, then lenders are likely to charge the firm a higher 
risk premium5 (Li et al. 2014; Kim et al., 2015). The firm’s default premium6 may also 
increase as credit rating agencies downgrade the debt of certain issuers in response to 
concerns about GHG emissions from GHG-intensive assets (Li et al. 2014). For instance, 
Standard & Poor’s downgraded the debt of a large U.K. power-generating firm, Drax, 
owing in part to future business risks from new European emissions trading rules that are 
expected to increase carbon costs (Barley, 2009; Matsumura et al., 2014). 
In this study, I expect that firms with relatively higher GHG emission levels have higher 
credit risk than firms with lower GHG emission levels. In other words, lenders are 
expected to impose a higher cost of debt on firms with higher GHG emissions. 
                                                           
5 The risk premium is the additional interest lenders must charge borrowers to compensate any risks that 
may increase the likelihood of default. 
6 The default premium is the additional amount a borrower must pay to compensate the lender for assuming 
default risk. 
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Consistent with these expectations, I propose the following hypothesis regarding the 
effect of GHG emissions on cost of debt: 
Hypothesis: There is a positive relationship between GHG emissions and cost of debt. 
 
Methodology 
Data and Sample selection 
Data on GHG emissions were hand-collected from CDP reports, while data on the cost of 
debt and other accounting and financial data were obtained from Bloomberg Professional 
database. 
My initial sample is based on all Canadian firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(S&P/TSX) that responded to the CDP questionnaire from 2012 to 2015 (462 firm-year 
observations). From this initial sample, I eliminated firms that responded to the CDP 
questionnaire but chose not to publicly publish their GHG emissions (137 firm-year 
observations). Finally, I excluded firms with missing some financial data on Bloomberg 
Professional database (7 firm-year observations), which reduced my final sample to 318 
firm-year observations (see Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
In order to analyze the sample firms by sector, I opted for the CDP sector classification. 
This classification consists of grouping Canadian firms into nine different sectors. Table 
2 presents the sample distribution by sector. The energy, materials, financials, industrials 
and consumer discretionary sectors made up the largest proportion of firms (24.84 %, 
19.50 %, 18.55 %, 11.63 %, and 10.38 %, respectively), whereas telecommunications 
Page 9 of 29
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/csrem
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
10 
 
services, utilities, IT and consumer staples sectors made up the smallest proportions (5.66 
%, 4.72%, 2.52 %, and 2.20 %, respectively). 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Variables measurements 
Dependent variable: Cost of debt (CoD) 
To measure the cost of debt I used the Bloomberg calculation method. Bloomberg (2013, 
p.18) describes his calculation method of cost of debt as follows: “Weighted average cost 
of debt for the security, calculated using government bond rates, a debt adjustment factor, 
and the proportions of short and long term debt to total debt. The debt adjustment factor 
represents the average yield above government bonds for a given rating class. The lower 
the rating, the higher the adjustment factor. The debt adjustment factor (AF) is only used 
when a company does not have a fair market curve (FMC).  When a company does not 
have a credit rating, an assumed rate of 1.38 (the equivalent rate of a BBB+ Standard & 
Poor’s long term currency issuer rating) is used”.   
CoD= [[(SD/TD) * (CS * AF)] + [(LD/TD) * (CL * AF)]] * [1-TR] 
Where:  
SD = Short Term Debt (in millions of C$) 
TD = Total Debt (in millions of C$) 
CS = Pre-Tax Cost of Short Term Debt (in %) 
AF = Debt Adjustment Factor (in %) 
LD = Long Term Debt (in millions of C$) 
CL = Pre-Tax Cost of Long Term Debt (in %) 
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TR = Effective Tax Rate (in %) 
For example, a cost of debt of 3.9 % means that for every 1$ raised from lenders, the 
company must pay its lenders almost 0.04$ in return.   
 
Independent variable: GHG emissions 
Following prior studies that used CDP data (e.g. Wegener et al., 2013; Matsumura et al., 
2014; Luo and Tang, 2014) I measured GHG emissions in two different ways: Total 
GHG emissions and GHG emissions intensity. 
- Total GHG emissions (in metric tons) are measured as the total of direct emissions 
from GHG sources owned or controlled by the firm (Scope 1) and indirect emissions 
caused by the firm’s consumption of electricity, heat or steam (Scope 2) (Matsumura 
et al., 2014). 
- GHG emissions intensity is measured as the ratio of total GHG emissions to total 
sales. This intensity measure allows to control for the extreme difference that exist 
between sectors. Moreover, relative to total emissions, this intensity measure is more 
comparable across firms and between different reporting periods (Wegener et al., 
2013; Luo and Tang, 2014; Kim et al., 2015). 
 
Empirical model  
To examine the relationship between GHG emissions and the cost of debt, the cost of 
debt (CoD) is regressed on GHG emissions, along with control variables that are known 
to affect CoD. The selection of control variables was guided by prior literature on cost of 
Page 11 of 29
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/csrem
Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
12 
 
debt (Anderson et al., 2004; Orens et al., 2010; Qi et al., 2010; Goss and Roberts, 2011; 
Lorca et al., 2011; Zhu, 2014).  
 
CoDit = β0 + β1 GHGit + β2 ROAit + β3 SIZEit + β4 LEVit + β5 SIZEit + β6 M/Bit  
     + β7 VOLit + ∑ SECT + ∑ YEAR + εit 
where  
CoDit = The cost of debt for firm i in year t 
GHGit = Total GHG emissions or GHG emissions intensity of firm i in year t 
ROAit = Return on assets measured as net income/total assets of firm i at the end of year t   
SIZEit = Size measured by logarithm of total assets of firm i at the end of year t   
LEVit = Leverage measured as total debt/total assets of firm i at the end of year t   
M/Bit = Market to book value measured by the ratio between market value and book 
value of equity of firm i at the end of year t   
VOLit = Volatility measured by the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns of 
firm i in year t 
∑ SECT = Sector fixed effect7 
∑ YEAR = Year fixed effect8 
εit = Error term. 
All data on control variables were extracted from Bloomberg Professional database. 
 
                                                           
7 Because the sample firms belong to 9 sectors (consumer discretionary, consumer staples, energy, 
financials, industrials, IT, materials, telecommunications services and utilities), I included indicator 
variables to control for sector effects. Indeed, not all sectors are polluting and each sector may have specific 
regulations regarding GHG emissions.     
8 Because the study covers four-year period (2012-2015), I included indicator variables to control for time 
effects in order to control for variations in the data. 
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Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the study’s variables. The mean of cost of 
debt (CoD) is 2.42 % and ranges from 0 % to 4.89 %, which is in line with prior studies 
(e.g. Goss and Roberts, 2011; Li et al., 2014). The mean of total GHG emissions is 
2754995 metric tons, while the mean of GHG emission intensity is 618.928. This figure 
means that our sample firms emit approximately 619 tonnes GHG per million dollars of 
sales on average, which also is in line with prior studies (e.g. Chapple et al., 2013; Kim et 
al., 2015; Griffin et al., 2017). 
Regarding the control variable, the Table 3 shows that the mean value of ROA is 1.120 
and ranges from -56.697 and 24.272, showing that our sample contains performing and 
non-performing firms. The mean value of firm size (SIZE) proxy is 9.681 (equivalent of 
$527 billion Canadian), indicating that our sample included relatively larger firms. The 
mean value of leverage (LEV), market-to-book (M/B) and volatility (VOL) are 0.241, 
1.338 and 29.8, respectively, which are comparable with previous studies (e.g. Anderson, 
2004; Qi et al., 2010; Goss and Roberts, 2011; Lorca et al., 2011; Zhu, 2014).     
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics by sector and ANOVA results between sectors. 
These results show that there is a significant difference at 1% level across sectors with 
respect to GHG emissions (ANOVA = 19.798 and 58.454) and the cost of debt (ANOVA 
= 4.610). Table 4 also shows that Utilities sector is ranked 1st in terms of GHG emissions 
and cost of debt, followed by Energy, Materials and Industrials sectors. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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Correlation analysis 
Table 5 presents Pearson correlation coefficients among the study’s variables. As shown 
in this table, the correlations between the cost of debt (CoD) and the two measures of 
GHG emissions (Total GHG emissions and GHG emissions intensity) are positively 
significant at 1 per cent level (0.186 and 0.182). This finding supports the hypothesis 
according to which there is a positive relationship between GHG emissions and cost of 
debt. This implies that lenders incorporate firms’ GHG emissions into their lending 
decisions. In other words, firms with high GHG emissions suffer from a higher cost of 
debt. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Regarding the control variables, Table 5 reports that the cost of debt (CoD) is negatively 
and significantly correlated with ROA, SIZE, and M/B, respectively, which in line with 
prior studies (e.g. Anderson et al., 2004; Orens et al., 2010; Goss and Roberts, 2011; 
Lorca et al., 2011; Zhu et al., 2014). However, the correlation between cost of debt (CoD) 
and LEV is positively significant, which also in accordance with previous studies (e.g. 
Orens et al., 2010; Goss and Roberts, 2011). Finally, the cost of debt (CoD) does not 
seem to be significantly correlated with volatility (VOL). 
In sum, Table 5 shows that the correlations between explanatory variables are well below 
the critical value of 0.7, thus indicating no evidence of multicollinearity. Moreover, Table 
6 shows that Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores are all lower than 2.0, which confirm 
that there is no problem of multicollinearity. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
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Regression analysis 
Table 6 reports the results of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of cost of debt 
on GHG emissions and control variables. In Model 1 I use the Total of GHG emissions as 
independent variable while the GHG emissions intensity is used as independent variable 
in Model 2. 
As shown in Table 6, GHG emissions (Total GHG emissions and GHG emissions 
intensity) have a positive association with the cost of debt (CoD) after controlling for all 
of the variables known to affect the cost of debt (β=0.152; p<0.01 and β=0.111; p<0.10).  
The positive association means that higher GHG emissions contribute to the overall firm 
risk. Thus creditors require a higher risk premium to lend money to the firm, which 
increases its cost of debt. 
This finding supports the hypothesis, implies that lenders incorporate firms’ GHG 
emissions into their lending decisions. Accordingly firms with high GHG emissions 
levels confront higher financing costs when they raise capital from outside borrowers, 
which corroborates the results of Li et al. (2014). 
Table 6 also shows that coefficients of GHG emissions range from 0.152 in Model 1 to 
0.111 in Model 2. The average of the coefficients is 0.131, indicating that on average, for 
each additional tonne of GHG emissions, the cost of debt increases on average by 11-15 
%, which is considered as a financial penalty for the firm. This calculation allows firms 
to make optimal financing decisions that aim at reducing GHG emissions and cost of 
debt. A similar result was found by Kim et al. (2015) for the cost of equity. 
These empirical findings imply that Canadian-listed firms with high GHG emissions have 
to reassess their borrowing abilities because lenders may require higher interest rates 
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owing to the uncertainty concerning the impact of future emissions (Li et al., 2014). 
Moreover, if the company management has to consider an impairment test because of the 
GHG emissions legislation, it has to assess the risks that these emissions represent to the 
cost of debt according to International Accounting Standard (IAS)9 36: Impairment of 
Assets. 
Finally, Table 6 reports that the cost of debt (CoD) is negatively and significantly 
associated with ROA, SIZE, M/B and VOL, respectively, which in line with prior studies 
(e.g. Anderson et al., 2004; Orens et al., 2010; Goss and Roberts, 2011; Li et al., 2014). 
These results imply that high performing and large firms with growth opportunities and 
volatile stocks benefit from lower debt costs. However, the association between CoD and 
LEV is positively significant, which also in accordance with previous studies (e.g. 
Anderson et al., 2004; Orens et al., 2010; Goss and Roberts, 2011). This implies that 
highly indebted firms suffer from a higher cost of debt. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper investigates the relation between GHG emissions and cost of debt and 
estimates the cost that lenders are imputing to GHG emissions.  
Using a sample of 318 firm-year observations for Canadian firms from nine different 
sectors over the period 2012-2015, the results show that GHG emissions increase firms’ 
cost of debt. In other words, for each additional tonne of GHG emissions, the cost of debt 
increases on average by 11-15 %. These results imply that creditors include the GHG 
emissions in the risk analysis of the firm and they penalize the polluting firms.  
                                                           
9 Canadian-listed firms have mandatorily adopted the IAS/IFRS since 2011. 
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This study is one of the first to directly investigate the effect of GHG emissions on the 
cost of debt in Canada and has important implications for markets participants, firms, 
environmental regulators, accounting profession, and academia.  
For market participants, the results show that, although the Pan-Canadian Framework on 
Clean Growth and Climate change comes into effect only in 2018, the markets have 
already anticipated the effects of GHG emissions on the cost of debt. The findings 
suggest that lenders take into account extra-financial information on companies’ 
environmental performance when assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers because 
they are aware of potential future risks that can arise for GHG-intensive firms (Kleimeier 
and Viehs, 2016). Therefore, lenders and other participants are advised to include GHG 
emissions as a risk factor when they make financing decisions. 
For firms, the results could encourage firms to reduce and manage their GHG emissions 
since there is a cost associated with these emissions. Given that the findings show that 
firms may face significant risks of financing due to their emissions, firms involved in the 
Pan-Canadian Framework are recommended to assess their carbon price exposures in a 
timely manner and implement appropriate strategies to mitigate these GHG-related risks 
(Li et al., 2014). In this setting, the results could help firms to understand GHG emissions 
risks and include GHG emissions when assessing environmental performance. The 
findings could also encourage firms to adopt a more comprehensive strategy and actions 
to deal with climate change.  
For environmental regulators, the findings show that the Pan-Canadian Framework will 
bring significant financial risks to the firms. It is suggested that regulators take these 
financial risks into account when they evaluate and update environmental legislation (Li 
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et al., 2014). The results could also assist the regulators in the development of future 
policies regarding the disclosure of firm’s GHG-related activities (Jung et al., 2014).   
For accounting profession, the findings are important evidence for its view that GHG 
emissions will bring some financial risks to Canadian and international firms (Li et al., 
2014). The recently introduced Pan-Canadian Framework is an impairment indicator and 
Canadian firms can apply IAS 36 to reassess their GHG emissions liabilities and assets, 
and thus, costs of debt. 
Finally, for academia, the results corroborate the view that companies need an upgraded 
accounting system to meet the needs of a low-carbon economy (Ratnatunga et al., 2011). 
Accounting academics have to develop courses in carbon accounting, auditing and 
management to train students to practice in a green business environment (Luo and Tang, 
2014). 
This research is not without its limitations. First, the sample consists of S&P/TSX 
Canadian firms who respond to the CDP questionnaire. This sample was selected on the 
basis of size measured by the market capitalization. The results may therefore apply only 
to large Canadian firms but not small ones. Second, restricting the analysis to publicly 
listed firms can also restrict the generalizability of results to these firms only. Third, the 
analysis is relied on CDP reports; thus, it is probably inappropriate to generalize the 
results to GHG emissions information disclosed through other communication channels. 
Finally, this research does not investigate the cost of GHG emissions control or GHG risk 
management that may be of interest to lenders and other market participants. The 
relationship between the cost of GHG emissions control and the cost of debt can be 
investigated in a further research. The effect of a firm’s GHG risk management strategy 
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can also be investigated in a further research as a mediating/moderating variable in the 
association between GHG emissions and cost of debt. 
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Tables and Appendix 
Table 1: Sample selection process 
Sample 2012 2013 2014 2015 Firm-year 
observations 
Initial sample: All S&P/TSX 
Canadian firms responding to 
the CDP questionnaire  
105 116 119 122 462 
(-) firms that responded to the 
CDP questionnaire but chose 
not to publicly publish their 
GHG emissions  
30 36 33 38 137 
(-) firms with missing some 
financial data on Bloomberg 
Professional database 
1 1 2 3 7  
= Final sample 
 
74 79 84 81 318 
 
 
 
Table 2: Sample distribution by sector 
Sector* Firm-year 
observations 
% 
Consumer discretionary 33 10.38  
Consumer staples 7 2.20 
Energy 79 24.84  
Financials 59 18.55  
Industrials 37 11.63  
Information technology (IT) 8 2.52  
Materials 62 19.50  
Telecommunications services 18 5.66  
Utilities 15 4.72  
Total 318 100 
Notes: *CDP sector classification. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median S.D. Minimum Maximum 
CoD (in %) 2.42 2.41 0.926 0.00 4.89 
Total GHG 
emissions 
(in metric tons) 
2754995 391898 5255.218 10 35072724 
GHG emissions 
intensity (in %) 
618.928 151.121 17.245 0.016 15470.985 
ROA (in %) 1.120 2.155 8.337 -56.697 24.272 
SIZE (in log) 9.681 9.399 1.723 6.198 18.773 
Total assets 
(in millions of 
C$) 
527529 12072 7970.921 491 142181296 
LEV (in %) 0.241 0.229 0.144 0.000 0.689 
M/B (in %) 1.338 1.209 0.516 0.616 4.332 
VOL (in S.D.) 29.800 22.136 20.229 5.909 118.649 
Notes: N = 318 firms. Please see Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics by sector and ANOVA 
Sector* Total GHG 
emissions 
(in metric tons) 
GHG emissions 
intensity  
(in %) 
Cost of debt  
(in %) 
Mean Rank Mean Rank Mean Rank 
Consumer discretionary 702576 5 17.618 9 2.26 6 
Consumer staples 437130 6 31.598 7 2.21 7 
Energy 5490612 2 706.610 2 2.45 4 
Financials 138091 8 46.856 6 2.05 8 
Industrials 1676521 4 301.973 4 2.40 5 
Information technology 129675 9 31.485 8 1.67 9 
Materials 2365548 3 441.464 3 2.75 2 
Telecommunications services 192510 7 60.516 5 2.48 3 
Utilities 12982660 1 6502.991 1 3.16 1 
ANOVA 19.798*** 
 
58.454*** 4.610*** 
Notes: *CDP sector classification. ***Significant at 1 per cent level. 
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Table 5: Correlation matrix 
Variables CoD Total GHG 
emissions 
GHG emissions  
intensity 
ROA SIZE LEV M/B VOL 
CoD 1        
Total GHG 
emissions 
0.186*** 1       
GHG emissions  
intensity 
0.182*** 0.699*** 1      
ROA -0.274*** 0.013 -0.060 1     
SIZE -0.104* 0.148*** -0.111** 0.055 1    
LEV 0.195*** 0.194*** 0.233*** -0.003 -0.187*** 1   
M/B -0.155*** -0.051 -0.102* 0.446*** -0.293*** 0.138** 1  
VOL -0.041 0.004 0.058 -0.436*** -0.284*** -0.017 -0.278*** 1 
Notes: N = 318 firms. Please see Appendix for variable definitions. ***,**,*Significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Regression analysis 
Dependent variable: Cost of debt (CoD) 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
B t VIF B t VIF 
Intercept N/A 7.131*** N/A N/A 7.141*** N/A 
Total GHG 
emissions 
0.152 3.116*** 1.10    
GHG 
emissions 
intensity 
   0.111 1.850* 1.09 
ROA -0.298 -3.630*** 1.47 -0.311 -3.621*** 1.46 
SIZE -0.148 -2.241** 1.49 -0.163 -2.528** 1.36 
LEV 0.159 2.616*** 1.15 0.150 2.373** 1.11 
M/B -0.143 -2.116** 1.54 -0.143 -2.028** 1.55 
VOL -0.238 -3.425*** 1.63 -0.268 -4.429*** 1.44 
Sector effect Yes Yes 
Year effect Yes Yes 
Adj. R² 0.210 0.166 
F-test 11.285*** 11.237*** 
N 318  
Notes: Please see Appendix for variable definitions. All t-statistics are corrected using 
the Huber-White procedure. ***,**,*Significant at 1, 5 and 10 per cent level, 
respectively.  
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
Variables Definitions 
CoDit The cost of debt for firm i in year t is measured as following: 
CoD = [[(SD/TD) * (CS * AF)] + [(LD/TD) * (CL * AF)]] * [1-TR] 
Where: SD = Short term debt, TD = Total debt, CS = Pre-tax cost of 
short term debt, AF = Debt adjustment factor, LD = Long term debt, 
CL = Pre-tax cost of long term debt, and TR = Effective tax rate. 
GHGit Total GHG emissions (in metric tons) of firm i in year t are 
measured as the total of direct emissions from GHG sources owned 
or controlled by the firm (Scope 1) and indirect emissions caused by 
the firm’s consumption of electricity, heat or steam (Scope 2). 
 GHG emissions intensity of firm i in year t is measured as the ratio 
of total GHG emissions to total sales. 
ROAit Return on assets measured as net income/total assets of firm i at the 
end of year t   
SIZEit Size measured by logarithm of total assets of firm i at the end of 
year t   
LEVit Leverage measured as total debt/total assets of firm i at the end of 
year t   
M/Bit Market to book value measured by the ratio between market value 
and book value of equity of firm i at the end of year 
VOLit Volatility measured by the standard deviation of the monthly stock 
returns of firm i in year t 
SECT Sector fixed effect. The sectors are: consumer discretionary, 
consumer staples, energy, financials, industrials, IT, materials, 
telecommunications services and utilities. 
YEAR Year fixed effect. The years are: 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. 
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Figure 1: Emissions per Capita for Top 10 Emitters 
 
*LUCF refers to emissions stemming from land-use change and forestry. 
Source: Adapted from World Resources Institute (2017) and CTV News (2017) 
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